BootJacker: Compromising Computers using Forced Restarts

TitleBootJacker: Compromising Computers using Forced Restarts
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2008
AuthorsChan, Ellick, Carlyle Jeffrey C., David Francis M., Farivar Reza, and Campbell Roy H.
Conference NameConference on Computers and Communications Security
Pagination555-564
PublisherACM
Conference LocationAlexandria, Virginia, USA
Publication Languageeng
ISBN Number978-1-59593-810-7
Keywordssecurity, memory remanence, attacks
Abstract

BootJacker is a proof-of-concept attack tool which demonstrates that authentication mechanisms employed by an operating system can be bypassed by obtaining physical access and simply forcing a restart. The key insight that enables this attack is that the contents of memory on some machines are fully preserved across a warm boot. Upon a reboot, BootJacker uses this residual memory state to revive the original host operating system environment and run malicious payloads. Using BootJacker, an attacker can break into a locked user session and gain access to open encrypted disks, web browser sessions or other secure network connections. BootJacker's non-persistent design makes it possible for an attacker to leave no traces on the victim machine.

Custom 1

New York, NY, USA

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2008

Citation Key230